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Over the past two hundred years -- some would argue even longer -- financial events, 
such as the devaluation of a currency or an announcement of default, have been capable 
of triggering an immediate adverse chain reaction among countries within a region and in 
some cases across regions.1  The impact of these shocks on the countries unfortunate 
enough to be affected usually included sharp declines in equity prices, a spike in the cost 
of borrowing in international capital markets, and a significant drop in the availability of 
capital.  In more extreme cases, countries have lost access to cross-border capital flows. 
Significant declines in output have been the norm in these episodes.  Yet, it is remarkable 
that on other occasions similar events have failed to trigger any international reaction, at 
least on impact.  In some instances, financial markets appear to be quite willing to shrug 
off an event that will obviously have strong trade and real sector repercussions on the 
crisis country’s neighbors.  
Among recent experiences, the devaluation of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997 and the 
Russian default on August 18, 1998 fall squarely into the first category, as both 
announcements had a resounding impact on international capital markets and were 
associated with a collapse in capital flows to emerging markets.  In the case of Thailand, 
the turbulence was largely confined to Asia, but the repercussions of the Russian default 
went well beyond the transition economies and hit Brazil, Hong Kong and Mexico 
particularly hard.   In a historical context, the bursting of the capital flow “bubbles” in 
1826 and 1873 – though undoubtedly related to financial crises in the “core” countries – 
was clearly accelerated by default announcements in the “periphery”  (Latin America).  
In fact, the 1826 episode –the first Latin American debt crisis – came barely a year after 
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the end of the independence struggles and foreshadowed two hundred years of crises to 
come.2    
At the other end of the spectrum, recent similar events with limited immediate 
consequences include Brazil’s devaluation of the real on January 13, 1999 and eventual 
floatation on February 1. The only discernible international consequence of this event 
was an increase in volatility in some of the larger Latin American equity markets that 
lasted a few days.  In effect, as Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) observe, the Brazilian 
equity market staged a rally that week, with equity prices rising about 52 percent.  The 
Argentine default and abandonment of the Convertibility Plan in December 2001-January 
2002 and Turkey’s devaluation of the lira on February 22, 2001 are two additional 
examples of instances where international capital markets were unmoved by events.3  
Given that both Turkey and Argentina are relatively large emerging markets, these 
episodes could also have turned out to be – at least potentially -- as highly “contagious” 
as the Thai and Russian crises. 
Before further discussion, however, a note on terminology is in order. Since the term 
“contagion” has been used liberally and taken on multiple meanings, it is useful to clarify 
how it will be used in this paper at an early stage.  In what follows, we refer to contagion 
as an episode in which there are significant immediate effects in a number of countries 
following an event -- that is, when the consequences are fast and furious and evolve over 
a matter of hours and days.  This “fast and furious” reaction is in contrast to cases in 
which the initial international reaction to the news is muted.  The latter cases, however, 
do not preclude the emergence of gradual and protracted effects that may cumulatively 
have major economic consequences.  We refer to these gradual “death by a thousand 
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cuts” cases as spillovers.  Common external shocks, such as changes in international 
interest rates or oil prices, are also not included in our working definition of contagion or 
spillover. 
On the basis of our reading of the empirical evidence and the literature, we offer the 
following observations regarding some key elements that distinguish the fast and furious 
contagion episodes from their quieter counterparts. 
First, fast and furious contagion cases usually followed on the heels of a surge in 
capital inflows and, more often than not, the initial shock or announcement pricked the 
capital flow bubble, at least temporarily.  The capacity for a swift and drastic reversal of 
capital flows—the so-called sudden stop problem—is significant in these episodes (see 
Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).  After all, when contracts have short maturities (as has been 
the case in these contagion episodes), banks and bond holders can refuse to rollover their 
debts in short order.  Investors and financial institutions are exposed to the crisis country 
and often highly leveraged. In contrast, financial crises that have not set off major 
international dominos have usually unfolded against low volumes of international capital 
flows.  While domestic capital flight is always a possibility, the scope for a sudden 
retrenchment in foreign lending is limited.  Given lower levels of exposure, investors and 
institutions in the financial sector have a much lower need to adjust their portfolios when 
the shock occurs. 
Second, all the announcements that set off chain reactions have come by surprise.  By 
contrast, when similar announcements of devaluation and default elicited little or no 
immediate international reaction, the outcome tends to have been anticipated by financial 
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markets.  The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated events is critical, as 
forewarning allows investors to adjust their portfolios in anticipation of the event. 
Third, as to propagation mechanisms, in all cases where there were significant 
immediate international repercussions, a leveraged common creditor was involved—be it 
commercial banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, or bondholders.4  Indeed, in most of the 
cases of fast and furious contagion, the scope for effects through a trade channel was 
limited and, in some cases, non-existent.5  This does not imply, however, that trade 
linkages are not capable of producing gradual, but nonetheless significant, cumulative 
deleterious effects.  For instance, the collapse in world trade following the 1873 
international financial crisis had significant negative repercussions on the periphery’s 
ability to continue servicing an already large external debt.   In the same vein, there can 
be little doubt that the floatation and sharp depreciation of the Brazilian real in early 1999 
exacerbated the economic downturn that Argentina and Uruguay were experiencing at 
that time. 
On the incidence of contagion 
Apart from the anecdotal evidence from the various contagion episodes, the bulk 
of the empirical literature on contagion has primarily tried to establish whether contagion 
is systematically discernible in the data, be it manifested as the excess comovement of 
asset returns or as an increased probability of a domestic crisis when there is a crisis 
somewhere else. 6  The more general results from this literature may be summarized as 
follows.  
 Most studies find evidence of excess comovement in a variety of asset returns, 
whether sovereign debt or equity.  There is less consensus on whether this comovement 
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increases during a crisis.  Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have suggested that, when properly 
estimated, correlation coefficients across multi-country returns are not significantly 
higher during crisis periods.  Applying a different approach, Baig and Goldfajn (1998) 
and Kaminsky and Schmukler (1998) find evidence that news elsewhere have effects on 
asset prices, even after controlling for domestic fundamentals.  The evidence in these 
studies reveals nontrivial asymmetries between good and bad news.  In a historical 
context, Bordo and Murshid (2000) and Neal and Weidenmier (2002) provide mixed 
evidence regarding the existence of contagion, arguing that common shocks and the 
normal adjustment process under the gold standard may be enough to explain the 
observed turmoil in post-1880 crises.      
Calvo and Reinhart (1996) present evidence of “large neighbor” effects in capital 
flows to Latin America, with smaller countries being systematically influenced by capital 
account developments in their large neighbors.  Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) 
and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) show that the probability of a domestic crisis 
increases when there is a crisis elsewhere.  These, and other papers (i.e. Glick and Rose, 
1999), suggest that contagion tends to be regional.  In sum, by and large, most of the 
results in this literature support the anecdotal evidence and suggest that contagion is, one 
way or another, systematically present in the data. 
Crises with and without Mayor International Repercussions 
 This section reviews eight episodes of fast and furious contagion spanning nearly 
two hundred years.  We compare these to five episodes of “the-dog-did-not-bark” variety, 
where similar announcements produced limited consequences across national borders. 
Fast and furious contagion and adverse global shocks 
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Six of these episodes are generally accepted in the literature and the financial press 
as cases of contagion of the fast and furious variety.  Among the historical episodes, we 
include the first Latin American debt crisis -- which began with Peru’s default in April 
1826 -- and the international financial crisis of 1873.7  Among episodes of recent vintage, 
we review the European Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis of 1992-93, the Mexican peso 
crisis that began in December 1994, the Asian crisis of 1997, and the Russian default in 
August 1998.   
Two additional episodes of far-reaching financial turmoil -- both ending in a string 
of defaults in Latin America and elsewhere -- are included.  These are the worldwide 
financial crisis of 1929-1933 and the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s.  It is 
debatable whether the full explanation for the international synchronicity of crises in 
these episodes lies in extreme and adverse common shocks (in the form of abnormally 
high and rising real interest rates, collapsing commodity prices, and, in the 1930s, a 
worldwide depression) or whether the bad shock was accompanied by contagion.  It can 
be said, however, that in both cases some of the same propagating mechanisms present in 
the other episodes were also at work.  In the 1929-1933 crisis, sharp selling in the UK 
and US stock markets in 1929 led to panic selling across Europe (see Morsy, 2002) and, 
later on, defaults in some small Latin American countries in early 1931 resulted in a 
sharp drop in debt prices of other highly indebted countries in the periphery.  In the case 
of the early 1980s, US banks played a similar role in propagating crises in Latin America 
as the Japanese banks did in Asia fifteen years later. 
 Tables 1 and 2 present some summary background material for each of these 
episodes, including information on the existence and nature of common external shocks, 
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the suspected main mechanism for propagation and contagion, and the countries that 
were most affected. 
Contagion that never happened  
Historically, there are far more crises without significant international consequences 
than crises that have given rise to fast and furious contagion.  Many of these crises have 
little or no international consequences and, perhaps, this should not come as a surprise.  
When, as far as international capital markets are concerned, countries are in a state of 
autarky (either voluntarily or otherwise), there is little reason to expect that a domestic 
crisis—no matter how deep—will have immediate repercussions in world capital 
markets.  The countries may be large (China or India) or comparatively small (Bolivia 
and Guinea-Bissau).  The cases of “contagion that never happened” that we focus on are 
not the ones where the rationale for lack of contagion is that obvious.  Specifically, we 
focus on five cases where the countries in question were not entirely shut out of capital 
markets and, indeed, figured as some of the largest players among emerging markets.  
The historical cases include the well-documented Argentina-Baring crisis of 1890, the 
crisis of 1907, which erupted in the United States (still part of the periphery at the time), 
and three recent episodes of devaluation and default in large emerging markets: Brazil in 
February 1999; Turkey in February 2001 and Argentina in December 2001-January 2002.  
Table 3 provides a similar summary of the episodes as that shown in Tables 1 and 2 for 
the fast and furious cases. 
The role of the capital flow cycle 
 We noted earlier that the fast and furious contagion episodes are typically 
preceded by a large surge in capital flows which, more often than not, comes to an abrupt 
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halt in the wake of a crisis. This rising financial exposure to emerging markets is not 
present to nearly the same extent in the crises without major external consequences.  The 
latter crises seem to occur when capital markets have already dried up. 
In the historical episodes, this pattern is very evident in the string of defaults 
during 1926-28 in Latin America, which came on the heels of the first wave of massive 
capital flows from Britain into Latin America during 1822-1825.  These capital flows 
included not only official borrowing by the newly-independent governments for fiscal 
and nation-building purposes, but also substantial equity capital to finance prospective 
silver and gold mines.  A second wave of capital flows from Britain came along during 
the 1850s and 1860s – partly related to the financing of railroads – and preceded the crisis 
of 1873 (Figure 1).  The 1929-1933 crisis was preceded by yet another wave of capital 
flows into emerging markets, which coincided with the shift of the financial epicenter of 
the world from London to New York.  Among Latin American countries, the borrowing 
binge during 1925-1928 was explained in large part by “development” loans, as 
governments saw an opportunity to carry out new public works and urban modernization 
projects with “cheap” money from New York (Marichal, 1989).  Capital flows peaked in 
1828, the year before the US stock market crash ushered a string of financial and 
currency crises around the world and eventually an international debt crisis  (Figure 1). 
Among the recent episodes, beginning with the events leading up to the debt crisis 
of the 1980s, the capital flow cycle has also played a key role in determining whether the 
effects of a crisis have significant international ramifications or not.   
In the late 1970s, soaring commodity prices, low and sometimes negative real 
interest rates, and weak loan demand in the United States made it very attractive for US 
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banks to lend to Latin America and other emerging markets—and lend they did.  Capital 
flows, by way of bank lending, surged during this period (see Figure 1). Yet, as far as the 
prospects of repayment of these loans, by the early 1980s the situation had changed 
significantly for the worse. US interest rates had risen markedly in nominal and real 
terms and, since most of the loans made had either short maturities or variable interest 
rates, the effects were passed on to the borrower relatively quickly. Commodity prices 
had fallen by almost 30 percent between 1980 and 1982 and many governments in Latin 
America were engaged in a spending spree that would seal their fate and render them 
incapable of repaying their debts.  Prior to Mexico’s default in August of 1982, one after 
one these countries experienced currency crises, banking crises, or both.  When Mexico 
ultimately defaulted, the highly exposed and leveraged banks retrenched from emerging 
markets in general and Latin America in particular.  During the decade that followed 
there were numerous crises in Latin America, including some of the worst peacetime 
hyperinflations.  Yet, these crises had minimal international repercussions, as most of the 
region was shut out of international capital markets.  The drought in capital flows lasted 
until 1990. 
Figure 2 shows net private capital flows for the contagion episodes of the 1990s.   
Figure 2 shares with Figure 1 the common pattern of a run-up in borrowing followed by a 
crash at the time of the initial shock and little or no borrowing thereafter.  Net private 
capital flows in the run-up to the ERM crisis in Europe had risen markedly and peaked in 
1992 before coming to a sudden stop.  In the case of Mexico, as the crisis loomed close in 
1994, capital flows were close to their 1992 peak after surging considerably, since as late 
as 1989 Mexico had overwhelmingly recorded net outflows.  The rise in capital flows to 
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Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (shown in Figure 2) was no less 
dramatic—especially after 1995, when Japanese and European bank lending to emerging 
Asia escalates. 
The bottom right panel of Figure 2 shows the evolution of capital flows to all 
emerging markets and the progression of crises (contagious and otherwise).  The halcyon 
days of capital flows to emerging markets took place during the first half of the 1990s, 
notwithstanding the Mexican crisis and its effects on Argentina.   The eve of the Asian 
crisis (1996) marks the peak of the cycle, and Asia delivers the first blow from which 
there is no recovery. It is the second emerging market crisis (after Mexico) that is 
associated with contagion.  The marked decline in capital flows in 1997 only underscores 
this point.  The Russian crisis of August 1998 delivers the second blow from which 
emerging market flows never fully recover in the 1990s.  As shown in the right bottom 
panel of Figure 2, this crisis is associated with the second major leg of the decline in 
private capital flows to emerging markets. 
Capital flows on the eve of the next three crises (the Brazilian and Turkish 
devaluations in January 1999 and February 2001, respectively, and the Argentine default 
at the end of 2001) evolved during the downturn of the cycle and at levels of net flows 
that were barely above the levels of the 1980s drought.  The World Economic Outlook 
estimates shown for 2002 and 2003 in Figure 2 may, in the end, overstate the actual 
outcome of capital flows to emerging markets in those years.  Indeed, because total net 
flows include foreign direct investment (FDI), which held up better than portfolio bond 
and equity flows, Figure 2 somewhat understates the extent of the sudden stop problem 
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that emerging markets faced in the post Russian (1998) crisis period.   The capital flow 
“bubble” had already been pricked. 
Surprise crises and anticipated catastrophes 
 The second point emphasized above is that fast and furious crises have a high 
degree of surprise associated with them while their quieter counterparts are more broadly 
anticipated.  This distinction appears to be critical when “potentially affected countries” 
have a common lender.  If the common lender is surprised by the shock in the initial 
crises country, there is no time ahead of the impending crisis to rebalance portfolios and 
scale back from the affected country.  On the other hand, if the crisis is anticipated 
investors have time to limit the damage by scaling back exposure or hedging their 
positions to the extent that they are capable. 
Sovereign credit ratings on the eve of crises 
 Evidence that quieter episodes were more anticipated than the fast and furious 
cases is presented in Table 4.   As shown in Table 4, Standard and Poor’s credit ratings 
had remained unchanged during the twelve months prior to of the Mexican and Thai 
currency crises.  In the case of Russia, there is actually an upgrade as late as June 1998, 
when the broader definition that includes the Credit Watch (CW) status is used.  Two 
downgrades eventually take place prior to the crises on August 13, 1998 and again on the 
17th, the day before the default.  By contrast, Argentina has a string  of downgrades as it 
marches toward default, with the first one taking place in October 2000, over a year 
before the eventual default.  Likewise, Brazil and Turkey suffer downgrades well before 
the eventual currency crisis. 
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Pre- and post-crisis sovereign bond spreads 
 Figures 3 through 5 plot spreads for major emerging countries for almost two 
hundred years.   Figure 3 shows the behavior of spreads for the three historical episodes 
of 1826, 1873, and 1929.8  Figures 4 and 5 show plots of the domestic-international 
interest rate differential for the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) and the EMBI+. 
As argued below, the overall message is that the fast and furious episodes are 
accompanied by sharp spikes in yield differentials – reflecting the unanticipated nature of 
the news -- whereas other episodes have tended to be anticipated by financial markets.  
 Figure 3 (top panel) -- which shows spreads for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Gran 
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru --  illustrates the, by and large, unexpected nature of the 
1826 crisis.  Spreads are comfortably below 500 basis points before the December 1825 
financial crisis in London and Peru’s default in April 1826.  Even Brazil, which not only 
did not default but was the only country in a position to negotiate several new loans 
during this period, saw its spread rise sharply as the crisis broke out.  The middle panel of 
Figure 3 shows spreads for Argentina, Egypt, Peru, Russia, and Turkey during the 1870s.  
In interpreting this plot, we should keep in mind that the international debt crisis per se 
(as opposed to the more general financial crisis that erupted in 1873 in Germany and 
Austria) reached its climax only in 1876 with the defaults of Peru, Turkey, and Egypt. In 
fact, right until then, investors in London had been worried mostly about small Latin 
American nations (Honduras, Santo Domingo, Costa Rica, and Paraguay, all of whom 
defaulted in 1873-1874) rather than large borrowers such as Peru, Turkey, and Egypt.   It 
is only in August 1875 – when an important bank with close ties to the government in 
Peru goes bankrupt -- that London financiers begin to worry about big lenders and 
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spreads begin to rise sharply and suddenly.   Finally, the bottom panel in Figure 3 shows 
spreads for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay during the period surrounding the 
crisis of 1929-1933.  Again – as in the 1873 crisis – it should be noted that the debt crisis 
erupts only in early 1931 (with Bolivia defaulting in January 1931).  At that point, there 
is a sharp spike in spreads. 9   
 The data presented in Figures 4 and 5 illustrates the fact that markets 
foreshadowed turbulence in the cases of Argentina (2001), Brazil (1999), and Turkey 
(2000).   Two features of the top panel of  Figure 3, which shows the weekly spread for 
Argentina, are worth noting.  First, consistent with the evolution of the sovereign credit 
ratings, the cost of borrowing begins to rise steadily and markedly about a year or so 
before the default on December 23, 2001.  Second, and less noticeable given the scale, 
there is a marked spike following the peso December 1994 crisis, when spreads reached 
nearly 2,000 basis points.  These two points can also be made about the middle panel, 
which shows Brazilian spreads.  There is a run-up in spreads well before Brazil floats the 
real on February 1,1999 and a roughly comparable increase after the Mexican 
devaluation.  What this chart also reveals is that Brazil—more so than Argentina—was 
quickly and markedly affected by the Russian crisis.  The contrast with the evolution of 
Mexico’s spread in the pre-crisis period is striking.  As shown in the bottom panel of 
Figure 3, spreads are stable at around 500 basis points in the months prior to the crisis.  
Like Brazil and Hong Kong (not shown), Mexico is one of the countries hardest hit by 
the Russian crisis in August 1998 and spreads rise to their highest levels since 1995.   
 Russian spreads, illustrated in the top panel of Figure 5, also show remarkable 
stability until a couple of weeks prior to the announcement and default.  In the case of 
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Russia, the devaluation of the ruble appears to have been widely expected by the markets 
(as evident on the spreads on ruble-denominated debt), it was the default that apparently 
took markets by surprise.  Interest rate spreads for Turkey, which like most emerging 
markets was affected by the Russian crisis, reveal (as do the cases of Argentina and 
Brazil) a steady rise in spreads throughout most of the second half of 2000. 
 It is also evident from Figures 4 and 5 that the emerging markets spreads shown 
here either are unmoved by the “anticipated events” or actually decline in some cases.  
For instance, following the Argentine default, spreads for Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey 
actually decline, while there is no discernible impact on the Thai and Russian spreads.  A 
similar pattern prevails following Turkey’s and Brazil’s currency crashes.  
Channels of Propagation 
Trade and finance links and other explanations 
 To explain why crises tend to be bunched, some recent models have revived 
Nurkse’s story of competitive devaluations, which emphasized trade, be it bilateral or 
through a third party.10  A devaluation in a given country makes it costly (in terms of a 
loss of competitiveness and output) for other countries to maintain their parity.  In this 
setting, a devaluation in a second country is a policy decision whose effect on output is 
expected to be salutary.  Hence, an empirical implication of this type of model is that we 
should observe a high volume of trade among the “synchronized” devaluers. As a story of 
“voluntary” contagion, of course, this explanation does not square with the fact that 
central banks often go to great lengths to avoid a devaluation in the first place, typically 
by engaging in an active interest rate defense of the peg (Lahiri and Végh (2003)).     
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 Another family of models has de-emphasized the role of trade in goods and 
services and stressed the role of trade in financial assets, particularly in the presence of 
information asymmetries.  Calvo and Mendoza (1998) present a model where the fixed 
costs of gathering and processing country-specific information give rise to herding 
behavior, even when investors are rational.  Kodres and Pritsker (1998) also present a 
model with rational agents and information asymmetries.  However, they stress the role 
played by investors who engage in cross-market hedging of macroeconomic risks.  In 
either case, these models suggest that the channels of transmission arise from the global 
diversification of financial portfolios.  As such, they have the empirical implication that 
countries with more internationally-traded financial assets and more liquid markets 
should be more vulnerable to contagion.  Small, highly illiquid markets are likely to be 
under-represented in international portfolios to begin with and, as such, shielded from 
this type of contagion. 
Calvo (1998), who also focuses on links via the financial sector, has stressed the 
role of liquidity.  A leveraged investor facing margin calls needs to sell (to an uninformed 
counterpart) his or her asset holdings.  Because of the information asymmetries, a 
“lemons problem” arises and the asset can only be sold at a firesale price. A variant of 
this story can be told about an open-end fund portfolio manager who needs to raise 
liquidity in anticipation of future redemptions.  In either case, the strategy will be not to 
sell the asset whose price has already collapsed but other assets in the portfolio.  In doing 
so, however, other asset prices fall and the original disturbance spreads across markets. 
 One potential channel of transmission that has been stressed by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000) is the role of common lenders, in particular commercial banks.  U.S. 
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banks had an extensive exposure to Latin America in the early 1980s, much in the way 
that Japanese banks did during the Asian crisis of 1997.  The behavior of foreign banks 
can both exacerbate the original crisis, by calling loans and drying up credit lines, but can 
also propagate crises by calling loans elsewhere.  The need to rebalance the overall risk 
of the bank’s asset portfolio and to recapitalize following the initial losses can lead to a 
marked reversal in commercial bank credit across markets where the bank has exposure. 
 The so-called “wake up call hypothesis” suggests that once investors “wake up” 
to the weaknesses that were revealed in the crisis country they will proceed to avoid and 
move out of countries that share some characteristics with the crisis country.11  So, for 
instance, if the original crisis country had a large current account deficit and a relatively 
“rigid” exchange rate, then other countries showing similar features will be vulnerable to 
similar pressures. 
 Finally, one could point to irrational behavior on the part of investors who follow 
fashions and fads, disregard fundamentals, and form their expectations by extrapolation.  
It is no doubt possible (if not appealing) that such “irrational exuberance,” to quote 
Chairman Greenspan, influence the behavior of capital flows and financial markets and 
exacerbate the booms as well as the busts. 
 Table 5 summarizes our take on the importance of the various propagating 
mechanisms discussed above in our sample of contagion episodes.   
Evidence from the empirical literature on the linkages 
Relatively few studies have gone beyond establishing that there is contagion or 
spillovers and attempted to assess the underlying causes.  Perhaps because trade in goods 
and services has a longer history in the post World War II period than trade in financial 
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assets, or because of far better data availability, trade links have received the most 
attention in the literature on contagion.  Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) find 
evidence that trade links help explain the pattern of contagion in 20 industrial countries; 
Glick and Rose (1999), who examine this issue for a much broader sample of countries, 
come to the same conclusion.  Because trade tends to be more intra- than inter-regional in 
nature, Glick and Rose (1999) conclude that this helps explain why contagion tends to be 
regional rather than global. 
However, these results are by no means unanimous. In a horse race that compares 
countries clustered along the lines of trade links versus common bank creditors, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) conclude that the latter better explains the observed 
pattern of contagion.   Mody and Taylor (2002), who seek to explain the comovement in 
an exchange market pressures index by bilateral and third-party trade and other factors 
also cast doubt on the importance of trade linkages in explaining the propagation of 
shocks.  
Table 6 shows bilateral trade patterns among the crisis and contagion countries for 
the year before the crisis.  Specifically, it presents the share of total exports in the 
affected countries that is accounted for by the original crisis country.  Hence, on the eve 
of the Tequila crisis only 1.7 percent of Argentina’s total exports went to Mexico.   
Similarly, Brazil which suffered acute pressures with spreads doubling (Figure 3) and 
equity prices falling by more than twenty percent in the weeks following the Russian 
default, barely trades with Russia, as only 0.2 percent of its exports are destined for 
Russian markets.    
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These relatively trivial bilateral trade links among the crisis and affected  
countries in episodes of fast and furious contagion are in sharp contrast to the strong trade 
links with the crisis country that characterize some of the cases where there was little 
contagion.  About 30 percent of Argentina’s exports are destined for Brazil, yet in the 
week following the devaluation, the Argentine equity market increases by twelve percent.  
Similarly, at nearly 13 percent, the share of Uruguay’s exports that are destined for the 
Argentine market is well above the shares shown in Table 6 for countries that 
experienced fast and furious contagion in one episode or another.  Yet, it is noteworthy 
that the main reason why developments in Argentina ultimately had significant adverse 
consequences on Uruguay had, once again, less to do with trade and more to do with the 
idiosyncratic tight financial linkages between the two countries.  In particular, Uruguayan 
banks have for many years been host to Argentinean depositors, who thought their 
deposits safer when these were denominated in US dollars and kept across the Río de la 
Plata.  As the crisis deepened in Argentina, many of the deposits that fled from the 
Argentine banks found their way to Uruguay. When the Argentine authorities declared a 
freeze on bank deposits in December 2001, Argentine firms and households began to 
draw down the deposits they kept at Uruguayan banks.  The withdrawals escalated and 
became a run on deposits amid fears that the Uruguayan central bank would run out of 
international reserves.  
While the preceding discussion has focused exclusively on bilateral trade, like 
Glick and Rose (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) also study “looser” trade linkages, 
which involve competition in a common third market.  For the countries in Asia and 
Latin America, a common third party(ies) was identified.  The United States figures 
 19
prominently in trade with Latin America (not unlike the patterns in bank lending) and 
Japan figures prominently in Asian trade.  However, all five countries hit by the crisis in 
Asia during 1997 also export extensively to Hong Kong and Singapore.  While sharing a 
third party is a necessary condition for the competitive devaluation story, it is clearly not 
a sufficient one.  If a country that exports wool to the United States devalues, it is not 
obvious why this would have any detrimental effect on a country that exports 
semiconductors to the United States.  Clearly, the composition of trade will play a key 
role in determining whether the third party trade links carry any weight.   
 As illustrated in Table 5, the case for explaining who is hit by contagion through 
bilateral trade links is far from compelling.  However, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) 
show that the case of third-party trade links is somewhat more plausible for some of the 
Asian countries. Thailand exports many of the same goods to the same third parties as 
Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Korea.  This, of course, still leaves Indonesia and the 
Philippines largely unexplained. Third party trade also does not appear to account for the 
Tequila effects on Argentina and Brazil, whose export structures have little in common 
with Mexican exports, let alone looking for any similarities among the exports of Russia, 
Hong Kong, and Brazil. 
Other studies have instead emphasized the important role of common creditors 
and financial linkages.  The “type” of the common creditor may change but the story 
remains consistent.  Frankel and Schmukler (1998) and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler 
(2000) show evidence to support the idea that U.S-based mutual funds have played an 
important role in spreading shocks throughout Latin America by selling assets from one 
country when prices fall in another – with the Tequila crisis being a prime example. 
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Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), and Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) focus on the role played by commercial banks in 
spreading shocks and inducing a sudden stop in capital flows in the form of bank lending.  
Mody and Taylor (2002) link contagion to developments in the US high yield or “junk” 
bond market.  The common thread in these papers is that, without the financial sector 
linkages, contagion of the fast and furious variety would be unlikely.  
 
Concluding reflections 
It is difficult to draw any grandiose lessons from reviewing some of the contagion 
episodes that happened as well as those that could have happened. To the extent that a 
country is integrated with world capital markets, it is potentially vulnerable to fast and 
furious contagion, irrespective of how open or closed the economy is to trade in goods 
and services.  The crisis in the European Monetary System in 1992-93 showed that 
emerging markets do not have a monopoly on vulnerability to contagion, although they 
certainly tend to be more crisis prone. The prospect of financial autarky as a way of 
avoiding fast and furious contagion is not particularly attractive as a long run solution.  In 
fact, it may not even be feasible in the case of countries that have already liberalized the 
financial sector and the capital account.  Past experience has shown that capital flight has 
been an endemic problem for countries that have tried to turn the clock back and re-
introduce tight capital account and financial restrictions. 
To date, what has distinguished the contagion episodes that happened from those that 
could have happened has had little to do with more “judicious” and “discriminating” 
investors—nor with any improvements in the state of the international financial 
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architecture.  If investors behaved in a more discriminating manner in the cases where 
contagion could have happened but did not, it is because (i) those crises tended to unfold 
in slow motion and were thus widely anticipated and (ii) the capital flow bubble had been 
pricked at an earlier stage, when those same investors were still exuberant. 
When looking back into history, one is struck by an overwhelming sense of “déjà vu”, 
lending credence once more to the old French saying “plus ca change, plus c’est la meme 
chose” (the more things change, the more they remain the same).  The actors’ names may 
change (and sometimes not even that!), but the play being acted on the world stage has 
essentially not changed in two hundred years.  It certainly seems a mystery why cycles of 
major boom and busts recur over and over again, in spite of the seemingly major costs 
associated with crises. In our mind, understanding this phenomenon appears to be one of 
the major research challenges to come out of this bird-eye overview of two hundred years 
of crises and contagion.      
In the meantime – and given that that there is, in our view, little hope that during the 
good times future generations of investors will remember that the four most expensive 
words in history are this time it’s different -- perhaps the hope is that policymakers in 
countries that are integrated with world capital markets remember that many a surge in 
capital inflows has ended in a sudden stop—whether owing to home-grown problems or 
contagion from abroad.  As a consequence, prudent policymaking would at a minimum 
ensure that policies are not procyclical and that the government does not overspend and 
overborrow when international capital markets are all too willing to lend. 12  Ideally, 
bonanzas should be the time to pay down public debts, rather than adding to them.   In 
this context, fiscal reforms aimed at designing institutional mechanisms that would 
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discourage such procyclical behavior (particularly on the part of “provinces” or other 
autonomous entities) appear as an essential ingredient in preventing future crises from 
building up.  
Discouraging the private sector from borrowing abroad during boom periods may be 
more problematic and opens up the issue of controls or restrictions on capital inflows.  
While there may be cases in which such restrictions may be desirable -- especially when 
debt contracts have short maturities and are denominated in a foreign currency (as has 
been the case in the modern contagion episodes) – such countercyclical policies are 
politically difficult to implement and may have many undesirable side-effects.  More 
fundamentally, their effectiveness is rather unclear (see De Gregorio, Edwards, and 
Valdes (2000)), though they may help in tilting the composition of capital flows toward 
longer maturities.  In any event, it is hard to disagree with the notion that capital controls 
can hardly be the solution in the medium and long run and that only prudent public 
policies and institutional mechanisms that give public and private agents the right 
incentives will hopefully some day provide a more stable financial environment for 
emerging countries to operate in.  
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Table1.  Financial Crises with Major Immediate International Repercussions: 
1800-1930’s 
 
Origin of the shock: 
country and date 
Nature of common 
external shock (if any) 
Contagion 
mechanisms 
Countries affected 
Peru defaults, April 
1826 
Major commercial and 
financial crises in London 
during 1825-26, which 
spread to continental 
Europe.  Trade and capital 
flows with Latin America 
plummet.    
Upon Peru’s default, 
London bond holders 
immediately become 
concerned about other 
Latin American 
countries’ ability to 
service their debts; 
bond prices collapse.     
Chile and Gran Colombia 
(which comprised today’s 
Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela) default later 
in the year.  By 1828, all 
of Latin America, with 
the exception of Brazil, 
had defaulted.  
German and Austrian 
stock markets collapse, 
May 1873 
French war indemnity paid 
to Prussia in 1871 leads to 
speculation in Germany and 
Austria.  As far as the 
periphery is concerned, the 
world recession (1873-
1879) results in a dramatic 
fall in trade and capital 
flows originating in the 
core.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital flows to the 
U.S. fall in the wake of 
German crisis 
(Kindleberger 2000).  
Ensuing world 
recession (1873-1879) 
leads to debt servicing 
problems in the 
periphery through 
reduced exports and tax 
revenues.  Initial 
defaults in small 
Central American 
nations in January 1873 
leads to a fall in bond 
prices.     
Crisis spreads quickly to 
Italy, Holland, and 
Belgium, leaps the 
Atlantic in September and 
crosses back again to 
involve England, France, 
and Russia (Kindleberger, 
2000).   By 1876, the 
Ottoman Empire, Egypt, 
Greece, and 8 Latin 
American countries had 
defaulted.  
 
 
Wall Street crashes on 
October 24, 1929 
Between 1925 and 1932 
commodity prices fall by 
about 63 percent.  Capital 
flows originating in the US 
fall sharply as the stock 
market takes off in March 
1928.  Owing to deflation, 
US ex-post short-term real 
interest rates rise to about 
11 percent in 1932.  World 
output collapses between 
1929and 1933.  
Wall Street crash leads 
to widespread selling in 
stock markets across 
Europe. Initial defaults 
in Latin America in 
1931 cause a steep drop 
in debt markets prices 
of other countries in the 
periphery.     
Stock market/banking 
crises in most European 
countries. In the 
periphery, currency crises 
in various countries 
(Australia, Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay) in 1929, 
followed by defaults in   
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, and Peru in 
1931. By 1933, most 
Latin American nations 
(with the notable 
exception of Argentina) 
and many central 
European nations 
(Austria, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia) were in 
default. 
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Table2.  Financial Crises with Major Immediate International Repercussions: 
1980-2000 
 
Origin of the shock: 
country and date 
Nature of common  
external shock, if any 
Contagion 
mechanisms 
Countries affected 
Mexico defaults on 
external bank debt, 
August 1982 
Between 1980 and 1985, 
commodity prices fell by 
about 31 percent.  US short 
term interest rates rise to 
about 7 percent, the highest 
levels since the depression. 
U.S. banks, heavily 
exposed to Mexico, 
retrenched from 
emerging markets 
With the exception of 
Chile, Colombia and 
Costa Rica all countries in 
Latin America defaulted.   
On September 8, 1992 
the Finnish markka is 
floated and the ERM 
crisis unfolds 
High interest rates in 
Germany. The rejection by 
Danish voters of the 
Maastrich treaty. 
Hedge funds. All the countries in the 
European Monetary 
System except Germany. 
Mexico, devaluation of 
the peso,  December 
21, 1994 
Federal Reserve begins to 
raise interest rates in 
January 1994. 
Mutual funds sell off 
other Latin American 
countries, notably, 
Argentina and Brazil.  
Massive bank runs and 
capital flight in 
Argentina. 
Argentina suffered the 
most, losing almost 20 
percent of its deposits in 
early 1995.  Brazil was 
next, with losses in other 
countries in the region 
limited to declines in 
equity prices. 
Thailand, devaluation 
of the baht, July 2 
1997 
The yen depreciated by 
about 51 % against the US 
dollar during  April 1995 
and April 1997.  Given the 
Asian currencies link to the 
US dollar, this translated 
into a significant 
appreciation for their 
currencies as well. 
Japanese banks, 
exposed to  Thailand, 
retrenched from  
emerging Asia. As 
Korea is affected, 
European banks also 
withdraw. 
Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, and the 
Philippines were hit 
hardest.  Financial 
markets in Singapore and 
Hong Kong also 
experienced some 
turbulence. 
Russia defaults on 
domestic bond debt, 
August 18, 1998 
LTCM is revealed to be 
bankrupt. 
Margin calls and 
leveraged hedge funds 
fueled the sell off in 
other emerging and 
high yield markets.  It 
is difficult to 
distinguish contagion 
from Russia and fear of 
other LTCM. 
Apart from several of the 
former Soviet republics, 
Hong Kong, Brazil, and 
Mexico were hit hardest.  
But most emerging and 
developed markets were 
affected. 
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Table 3. Financial Crises without  Major Immediate International Repercussions 
 
Origin of the shock: 
country and date 
Background on the run-up 
to the shock 
Spillover mechanisms Countries affected  
Argentina, 1890.  Argentina stops dividend 
payments in April 1890, 
leading to a domestic bank 
run.  The House of Baring, a 
major lender to Argentina, 
declares itself insolvent in 
November 1890.  
Strong economic links 
between Britain and 
Argentina through trade 
and financial 
integration. 
Crisis mostly confined to 
Argentina and Uruguay 
(which defaulted in 1891). 
United States, 1907. Bank of England had begun 
tightening monetary policy 
in 1906, which reversed the 
g old flow into the U.S.  
Stock market crashes in 
early 1907 and by October 
there is a widespread run on 
commercial banks.     
Paris and London stop 
lending to Italy and 
other countries in the 
periphery.    
Mostly Germany, France, 
and Italy.     
Brazil.   
January 13, 1999 
The real is devalued. 
The crawling peg exchange 
rate policy that was adopted 
in mid-1994 to stabilize  
inflation is abandoned and 
the real is floated on 
February 1. 
There is an increase in 
volatility in some of 
larger equity markets 
and Argentina spreads 
widened.  Equity 
markets in Argentina 
and Chile rallied. These 
effects lasted only a few 
days. 
Significant and protracted 
effect on Argentina, as 
Brazil is Argentina’s 
largest trading partner. 
Turkey,  
February 22, 2001 
Devaluation and floatation 
of the lira. Facing 
substantial external 
financing needs, in late 
November 2000, rumors of 
the withdrawal of external 
credit lines to Turkish banks 
triggered a foreign exchange 
outflows and overnight rates 
soared to close to 2,000 
percent.   
 There has been some 
conjecture that the 
Turkish crisis may have 
exacerbated the 
withdrawal of investors 
from Argentina but given 
the weakness in 
Argentina’s fundamentals 
at the time, it is difficult 
to suggest developments 
owed to contagion. 
Argentina,  
December 23, 2001 
Following several waves of  
capital flight, on December 
1st capital controls are 
introduced.  The president 
announces intentions to 
default on the 23rd. 
Bank deposits fall by 
about one third in 
Uruguay, as Argentines 
withdraw deposits from 
Uruguayan banks.  
Significant effects on 
economic (trade and 
tourism) activity in 
Uruguay. 
Uruguay and, to a lesser 
extent, Brazil 
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Table 4. Expected and Unexpected Crises: 
Standard and Poor’s Sovereign Credit Ratings Before and After Crises 
 
Country Crisis Date Change in rating  
including credit 
watch (CW) 12 
months prior to the 
crisis/ Date 
Change in rating 
after the crisis/ 
Date 
Change in credit 
rating of foreign 
currency debt 
Fast and Furious Contagion Episodes 
Mexico December 21, 
1994 
None Downgrade/ 
December 23, 
1994 
BB+/Stable to 
BB+/CW-Negative 
Thailand July 2, 1997 None Downgrade/ 
August 1, 1997 
A/Stable to 
A/CW-Negative 
Russia August 18, 1998 1. Upgrade/ 
June 9, 1998 
2. Downgrades/ 
August 13 and 17 
Downgrade/ 
September 16, 
1998 
CCC/Negative to 
CCC-/Negative 
Crises with Limited External Consequences 
Brazil February 1, 1999 1. Downgrade/ 
September 10, 
1998 
2.  Downgrade/ 
January 14, 1998 
No immediate 
change 
 
Turkey February 22, 2001 1. Upgrade/ 
April 25, 2000 
2. Downgrade/ 
December 5, 2000 
3. Downgrade/ 
February 21, 2001 
Downgrade/ 
February 23, 2001 
 
B+/CW-Negative 
to  
B/CW-Negative 
 
Argentina December 23, 
2001 
1. Downgrade/ 
October 31, 2000 
2. Downgrade/ 
November 14, 
2000 
3. Downgrade/ 
March 19 and 26, 
2001 
4. Downgrade/ 
June 6, 2001 
5. Downgrade/ 
July 12, 2001 
 
  
Source: Standard and Poor’s, Sovereign Rating History Since 1975. 
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Table 5.  Propagation Mechanisms in Episodes of Contagion 
 
Episode Trade (see also Table 6) Common characteristic across 
affected countries 
Common creditor 
Peru,  
April 1826 
No evidence that trade links 
among affected countries 
played any significant role.   
Rapidly rising foreign currency 
borrowing to finance 
independence wars and nation 
building. 
London bond holders. 
German and 
Austrian stock 
markets 
collapse, May 
1873 
No evidence that trade links 
within the periphery played 
any significant role. Trade 
did play an important role in 
spreading the crisis from 
core to periphery.     
Heavy and rapid increases in 
external borrowing during 1850s 
and 1860s, partly to finance 
railroad construction.  Primary 
commodity producers.   
London bond holders 
Wall Street 
crashes on 
October 24, 
1929 
No evidence that trade links 
within the periphery played 
any significant role. Trade 
did play an important role in 
spreading the crisis from 
core to periphery.     
Heavy borrowing from New 
York to finance development 
projects.  Primary commodity 
producers.  
New York investment 
banks 
Mexico, 
August 1982 
As the entire region was 
affected, trade links are 
significant, even though 
there are low levels of 
bilateral trade among some 
of the affected countries. 
Large fiscal deficits, weak 
banking sectors, dependence on 
commodity prices and heavy 
external borrowing. 
U.S. commercial banks. 
Finland, 
September 8, 
1992--ERM 
crisis 
While bilateral exports to 
Finland from the affected 
countries are small, as shown 
in Table 6, there are 
substantial trade links among 
all the affected countries.  
Large capital  inflows, common 
exchange rate policy as part of 
the EMS. 
Hedge funds. 
Mexico, 
December 21, 
1994 
No significant trade links. 
Bilateral trade: with 
Argentina and Brazil was 
minimal. Little scope for 
third party trade story.  
Mexico’s exports to the 
United States were very 
different from Argentine and 
Brazilian exports. 
Exchange rate based inflation 
stabilization plans. Significant 
real appreciation of the exchange 
rate and concerns about 
overvaluation. Large capital 
inflows in the runup to the crisis. 
Primarily US 
bondholders, including 
mutual funds. 
Thailand, 
July 2 1997 
Bilateral trade with other 
affected countries was very 
limited. Malaysia exported 
similar products to some of 
the same third markets. 
Heavily managed exchange rates 
and large increase in the stock of 
short-term foreign currency debt.   
European and Japanese 
commercial banks 
lending to Thailand, 
Korea, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. Mutual 
Funds sell off Hong 
Kong and Singapore. 
Russia/LTCM, 
August 18, 
1998 
Virtually no trade with the 
most affected countries—
either bilateral or third part.. 
The most liquid emerging 
markets, Brazil, Hong Kong and 
Mexico were most affected.  
These three countries accounted 
for the largest shares of mutual 
fund holdings. 
Mutual funds and hedge 
Funds 
 
 33
Table 6.  Bilateral Trade between the Affected 
Countries and the Crisis Country 
Most affected countries Affected countries’ exports to crisis country 
(as a percent of total exports) 
Fast and Furious Episodes 
Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis:  Finland September 8, 1992 
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.5 
Denmark 2.1 
France 0.3 
Ireland 0.5 
Italy 0.4 
Norway  
Portugal 1.2 
Spain 5.6 
Sweden  
United Kingdom 0.9 
Tequila Crisis:  Mexico, December 21, 1994 
Argentina 1.7 
Brazil 2.4 
Asian Crisis: Thailand, July 2, 1997 
Indonesia  
Korea 1.7 
Malaysia 3.6 
Philippines 3.4 
Russian Crisis: August 18, 1998 
Brazil 0.2 
Hong Kong 1.3 
Mexico 0.0 
Cases without Immediate International Consequences 
Brazil Devalues and Floats: February 1, 1999 
Argentina 30.1 
Argentina Defaults:  December 23, 2001 
Uruguay 12.7 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, various years. 
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1 For instance, Neal and Weidenmeir (2002) also discuss the “contagion” dimension of 
the Tulip Mania of the 1630s and the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles of 1719-20.  See 
also Kindleberger (2000).   
 
2 See Dawson (1990) and Marichal (1989).   
 
3 Under the Convertibility Plan, Argentina had maintained a currency board arrangement 
in place since April 1991 
 
4 Frankel and Schmukler (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder (2000) have emphasized the important role of common creditors and financial 
linkages. 
 
5 Papers that have stressed the role of trade linkages include Eichengreen and Rose 
(1998) and Glick and Rose  (1999). 
 
6 The term “excess” refers to comovement that cannot be explained away by 
fundamentals. 
 
7 See Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), Bordo and Murshid (2000), Kindleberger (2000), 
and Neal and Weidenmier (2002) for detailed accounts of historical episodes of financial 
crises. 
 
8 For the 1826 episode, spreads are computed relative to France’s 5 percent bonds.  These 
data were graciously provided to us by Larry Neal and originate in James Wetenhall’s 
semi-weekly Course of the Exchange.  For the other two episodes, spreads are computed 
relative to UK government bonds and the data source is Global Financial Database.  
 
9 Spread data (not shown) for some major emerging countries during the 1907 crisis 
reveals little or no impact.  
 
10 See Gerlach and Smetts (1996). 
 
11 Morris Golstein (1998) coined the term. 
 
12 As documented in Talvi and Végh (2000), fiscal policy in emerging markets tends to 
be markedly procyclical with countries engaging in expansionary fiscal policy in good 
times and contractionary fiscal policy in bad times.   
